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Introduction
Deriving the necessary conditions that characterize the equilibrium wage is not as simple in search and matching models as it is in frictionless market clearing models. In the latter, it is assumed that if either a worker or a rm prefers not to participate in a given wage contract, that party can instantaneously, costlessly nd an alternative partner. No employer, then, will ever o er to pay more or less than the prevailing wage to his employees paying less would cause them to go elsewhere, while paying more would be, from the rm's point of view, wasteful. This indi erence property yields the marginal conditions which determine the equilibrium wage.
No such indi erence condition applies to the context of search, or to other contemporary models that incorporate costs of entering or exiting bilateral relationships, such as models with rm-speci c human capital or ring restrictions. With costly frictions, both members of an employer-employee pair are better o within their ongoing relationship than outside it, because if their match were to separate they would again have to su er the frictions before working with a new partner. The increment to the intertemporal welfare of the two partners that results from their match is called the match surplus. Wage determination, then, becomes a question of how much of the surplus accrues to each partner that is, wage determination requires bilateral bargaining. While bilateral bargaining theory acquired a powerful paradigm with the contribution of Rubinstein (1982) , there are still many di erent speci cations of bargaining which are actively debated in the literature. Thus, there is not yet a unique accepted wage speci cation for matching models.
The purpose of this paper is to shed some quantitative l i g h t on the debate over the appropriate way of specifying wage determination, on the basis of a calibrated model of the US economy. We compare four di erent wage frameworks which arise naturally from small changes in the bargaining process. No claim is made that the bargaining alternatives discussed here are new they are well known from the theoretical literature. Instead, we ask whether the various theoretical models exhibit quantitatively signi cant di erences, and we nd indeed that this is the case. The alternatives discussed here are all nested within the same calibrated general equilibrium economy and evaluated under the same set of parameters. The baseline model is that used in Costain (1997b) to perform a welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI), and our comparison across wage bargaining speci cations will include implications for optimal UI.
We will discuss the following alternative speci cations. First, we explore the e ects of imposing payroll taxes on workers, instead of on rms, and we also note that the precise way in which taxes enter into the threat point is important. Second, we consider the impact of monopsony purchasing power which potentially arises in matching models where rms employ m ultiple workers, or where they also purchase capital. Third, we explore the implications of two di erent de nitions of the match surplus, which de ne the threat point i n the surplus calculation either in terms of the payo associated with a strike, or the payo associated with a quit. A fourth issue worth exploring is the e ect of allowing the wage to vary with asset holdings in a concave utility model however, we leave this for future research, as it requires a very di erent computational framework from that employed for the other models.
The model
Before we go on to discuss the theoretical wage bargaining issues we wish to explore, we outline the calibrated macroeconomic model within which all our wage formulations will beembedded. In our model, nitely-lived, risk averse workers smooth consumption over time by accumulating assets, choose search e ort when unemployed, and su er disutility from work. Firms hire workers, purchase capital, and pay taxes to nance worker bene ts their equity is the asset accumulated by workers. A matching function relates unemployment, hiring expenditure, and search e ort to the formation of jobs separation is exogenous. Workers receive UI payments for the rst two periods of any unemployment spell, and social security bene tswhen retired. These aspects of the model are intended to capture the consumption smoothing bene ts of UI together with its disincentive e ects on job search and hiring. 
The problems of the worker and the rm
We will perform only steady state analysis in this paper, so it su ces to describe the problems of the worker and the rm without reference to any aggregate state variables. The worker chooses consumption and search intensity over time to maximize the expected present value of lifetime utility. Workers have a life of deterministic length T + T R periods for the rst T periods of life, they are able to work, and over the last T R periods, they are retired. We write I W T = (T + T R ) for the fraction of individuals of working age. The problem of a worker born at time 0 is stated in Table 1 , and workers bornat other times face analogous problems. Workers' consumption utility i s g i v en approximately by the constant relative risk aversion form (1= )c where the coe cient of relative risk aversion is 1 ; , with 1. The small constant is added to consumption in order to ensure bounded utility e v en when c = 0 . During the rst T periods of life, a worker will either beemployed or unemployed. If unemployed, she chooses search e ort s t , incurring search disutility D S s t , where D S > 0. If employed, she experiences a xed level of disutility D W > 0. She discounts utility over time at rate . In practice, numerical calculation of the model requires us to restrict her choices of consumption and search to nite non-negative s e t s C and S, both of which are assumed to include zero.
The state variables on which a w orker conditions her choices of consumption and search at time t are assets a t and employment status t . Five possible labor market states are relevant = 1 designates employment. The rst and second 1 For greater detail on the model, including parameterization issues, see Costain (1997b) . 2 We are abusing notation somewhat to simplify the statement of the problem. Consumption c t and search s t should be written as functions of assets and employment status instead of being merely subscripted by t. Also, the asset dynamics equation is written in a simpli ed form which fails to account for the fact that our numerical procedure keeps assets constrained to a nite grid at all times. Also subject to the employment transition equations:
pr( 0 = 1 ) = p 0 t = 5 for t T probability of unemployment at t + 1 if employed at t = 1 ; exp(; ) probability of employment a t t + 1 if unemployed at t = 1 ; exp ; s t Z periods of an unemployment spell are given by = 2 and = 3 , respectively = 4 refers to the third and later periods of an unemployment spell, when the worker is ineligible for UI. Finally, = 5 means that the worker is retired. The notation 1fg appearing in the worker's problem is an indicator function which equals 1 when its argument is true and zero otherwise. Workers receive w age w when employed, UI bene t b U over the rst two periods of any unemployment spell, and social security bene tb R when retired. Allowing for interest factor R between any two periods, the law o f motion for assets is: a t+1 = R a t + w1 f t =1g + b U 1 f t =2_ t =3g + b R 1 f t =5g ; c t
The labor status process begins with a positive probability p 0 of starting life employed.
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Employed workers not yet ready to retire face an exogenous probability 1 ;exp(; ) of becoming unemployed each period. The probability that an unemployed worker becomes employed is 1 ;exp(; s Z ) if search e ort s is chosen, which is approximately s Z if s is su ciently small. The coe cient is an endogenous variable which depends in equilibrium on the unemployment rate and on the level of recruitment b y rms, while Z 2 0 1] is an exogenous constant.
The rm's problem, unlike that of the worker, is an in nite horizon, deterministic problem, for we assume that rms are large enough to ignore uncertainty about the arrival of individual workers. Firms act in the interest of their shareholders by maximizing the present value of pro ts. They hire labor n t and purchase capital k t , producing gross output An t k t 1;
, and the net revenue above their costs is paid out as dividends. Each unit of investment expenditure i t creates one unit of new capital, while hiring expenditure h t leads to the arrival of new employees at rate qh t , where q is an endogenous coe cient related in equilibrium to the search and hiring e ort of all workers and rms. The fraction of capital which remains after one period's depreciation is exp(; k ), and likewise the fraction of workers who are still employed at the rm after a period is exp(; ).
For each worker, each period, rms must pay a tax and a w age w(n t k t ) which we write in general as a function of the rm's labor and capital stocks. This paper addresses the quantitative e ects of several versions of the wage w(n t k t ) w h i c h arise from a variety of sensible speci cations of the bargaining game. For all wage speci cations, we can state the rm's problem in terms of its value function V (n t k t ) as:
; w(n t k t )n t ; n t ; h t ; i t + 1 R V (n t+1 k t+1 ) s.t. n t+1 = qh t + exp(; )n t and k t+1 = i t + exp(; k )k t This problem yields the following pair of steady state Euler equations: R ; exp(; k ) = A(1 ; )n t k t ; ; n t @ @k t w(n t k t )
R;exp(; ) = q A n t ;1 k t 1;
; w(n t k t ) ; ; n t @ @n t w(n t k t ) !
This formulation of the problem embodiesconstant returns to scale under all versions of wage bargaining that we will study below| that is, the equilibrium size of rms is indeterminate. Hence we will use the notation n t to refer to the economy-wide total of employment, rather than employment at a speci c rm we will use k t , h t , and i t analogously.
Aggregate consistency and solution algorithm
Aggregate consistency between our descriptions of the problems of the worker and the rm imposes some additional necessary conditions on our equilibium. First, we require that the government follow a balanced budget at all times, equating total taxes to expenditure on UI and social security:
The variable u U I represents the fraction of workers who are currently in the rst or second period of an unemployment spell, and who are thus eligible for UI bene ts. We use the notation (a t) to refer to the numberof workers of age t with asset holdings a and employment status . We normalize the distribution so that the frequencies sum to the total numberof workers I:
Using this notation, the goods market clearing condition is An k 1;
The asset market clearing condition, which equates total interest earnings on workers' assets to total dividends on equity, can be written as:
; wn ; n; h ; i Consistency of separation ows is imposed by assuming that workers and rms become separated with constant probability (1 ; exp(; )) this means implicitly that fraction exp(; ) of the jobs held by retiring workers are inherited by newborn workers in the next period, which greatly simpli es the rm's problem. This approximation shows that the matching function has roughly constant returns to scale in hiring and unemployment, and is also an increasing, concave function of workers' search activity.
The model just described must be solved numerically, because with the utility function we are using, no analytical solution is available. For any policy parameters b U and b R , our solution method involves nding a xed point in three variables: the interest factor R, the matching coe cient , a n d t h e w age w. Guessing any values for R, , and w, together with the given b U and b R , gives the information needed to solve the individual's problem by backwards induction. The results of the worker's problem then give us all the information we need to impose the necessary conditions of the rm's problem, together with aggregate consistency conditions. Finally, w e use equations (6) and (10) to update R and , respectively, and we update w using one of the four wage equations which w i l l b e e x p l a i n e d i n t h e f o l l o wing sections of this paper. This algorithm is outlined in Table 2 . 3 The baseline simulation
Wage equation and parameterization
The baseline model is calculated using a wage bargaining speci cation we will call the \strike threat" wage. In this formulation, as we will see in Section 6 below, we can ignore intertemporal considerations and instead assume that the wage splits the surplus resulting from work at any given instant. By this surplus, we mean the di erence between the instantaneous payo due to work and that due to non-work, in other words, a strike. This surplus is calculated under the assumption that tax payments are due regardless of whether work occurs, and the rm is the party that pays the tax. We assume that the rm takes as given the wage that will result from the bargaining game, so that the terms @ @k w(n k) and @ @n w(n k) appearing in equations (1)- (2) are both zero.
We also ignore variation in the marginal utility of consumption across workers.
We use the notation M U (1= )( c + ) to represent the marginal utility associated with the average level of consumption cin the economy M P L A n ;1 k 1;
denotes the marginal product of labor. Under these assumptions, the instantaneous di erence in joint payo s between working and striking is M P L M U ; D W , since working produces the marginal product of labor but also causes the worker to su er disutility. The marginal utility M Uappears here in order to enable us to add a quantity denominated in goods units to one denominated in terms of utility. The part of instantaneous surplus which accrues to the worker is w M U ; D W hence imposing bargaining share for the worker gives the following wage equation:
The baseline parameterization is given in Table 3 . The simulation is carried out under bene t levels b U = b R = 0:33, which in equilibrium implies a replacement ratio of roughly 43%, similar to that in the U.S. 4 Engen and Gruber (1995) calculate that the U.S. replacement ratio is 44%. To set our remaining parameters, we begin with a normalization of I 1, so that quantities are expressed in per capita terms, and we set the time period equal to a quarter, so that T 180 and T R 60 are reasonable. The capital depreciation rate is set at k 0:025 perquarter, and the separation rate for job matches is chosen as 0:04, a compromise between the low separation rates of prime age white males and the much higher rates of younger and minority workers. The technological parameters A 0:63 and 0:67 are chosen to make the rm's behavior consistent with a share of labor income equal to 65% of output and a level of hiring expenditure equal to 1% of output, while simultaneously normalizing output to approximately one.
We impose an equal bargaining power speci cation, 0:5. The quarterly utility discount rate is 0:015, and the consumption utility function is logarithmic, so 0. Given our wage equation (14), it can be shown that obtaining labor's share equal to 65% requires setting work disutility equal to D W 0:78. The elasticity of the matching function with respect to hiring, following Blanchard and Diamond (1989) , is 0:55. The nal normalization of the model involves setting the coe cient on the matching rate equal to 2:2 this amounts to picking the units of search intensity, and is intended to yield an equilibrium level of search intensity roughly equal to one.
The nal parameters which must be chosen are D S and Z, which are a level parameter and an elasticity parameter relating search e ort to the probability of job nding. These two parameters are chosen to match four types of observations. First, they must imply a reasonable level of unemployment we target u = 0 :06. Also, from Meyer (1990) , we nd that the probability of job nding should rise from 0.5 in the penultimate quarter of UI eligibility t o roughly 0.7 in the last quarter of eligibility, a s w orkers search harder in anticipation of the expiration of their bene ts. Third, we learn from Solon (1985) and Meyer (1995) that a one percent increase in the replacement ratio should lead to a rise of 0.0005 in the level of unemployment. Finally, our parameter choices should lead to a fall in consumption of approximately 7% when job loss occurs, as documented in Gruber (1994) . The parameters chosen are D S 0:2 and Z 0:4 the calculations on which this and other parameter choices are based are described in detail in Costain (1997b) .
Baseline results
Observations relating to the production side of the model are quite easy to match, since that part of the model is overidenti ed by only one equation.
In our baseline equilibrium, which appears in Tables 4 and 5 as the b U = 0:33 case, labor's share of output (value added) is 65.72%, gross investment is 20.45% of output, and recruitment expenditures are 1.74% of output. Note that recruitment is de ned as an intermediate input, so it is subtracted o gross output to de ne value added. The baseline interest rate is 1.582%, and the capital stock is 8.2838 quarters of output.
Unemployment in our baseline is somewhat higher than we targeted, at 7.647%. Job loss is associated, on average, with a 3.497% drop in consumption. Raising the UI bene t from 0.1 to 0.6 almost doubles the unemployment rate, from 5.877% to 10.483%. The fall in gross output is cushioned by a large decrease in hiring expenditure, so value added falls by only 2.772% of its baseline. At the baseline UI level of b U = 0 :33, the certainty e q u i v alent of consumption can becalculated as 0.9958% of baseline average consumption.
5 Table 5 shows how welfare varies with UI, equating the changes in the three components of utility t o c hanges in the certainty equivalent of consumption, which i s then expressed as a fraction of baseline average consumption. The utility gain of 0.00919 shown in the rst column, for consumption utility, means that the certainty equivalent of consumption utility i s raised by 0.919% of baseline average consumption, when the UI payment i s lowered from 0.33 to 0.1. 6 Similarly, lowering UI from 0.33 to 0.1 lowers search disutility b y an amount equal to a 0.128% rise in the certainty equivalent of consumption, and also raises work disutility by an amount equal to a 1.189% fall in the certainty equivalent of consumption, where both these changes are stated as a percentage of baseline average consumption. Overall, the optimal level of UI bene ts in this model is approximately 0.36, which represents a replacement ratio of 46.76%. Raising UI from 0.1 to 0.36 leads to an improvement in overall utility equivalent to a rise of 0:154%+0:0013% = 0:167% in the certainty equivalent of consumption, as a fraction of baseline average consumption.
There are two main conclusions to be drawn about the e ects of UI in this model. First, in spite of the fairly high optimal replacement ratio in this simulation, consumption smoothing bene ts per se are small. This can be seen by noting that the certainty equivalent of the loss of consumption utility, -0.919%, which occurs when UI is raised from 0.1 to 0.33, is quite close to the corresponding percentage change in average consumption, which is (0:7633 ; 0:7697)=0:7633 = ;0:838%. That is, the utility impact of the change in the consumption distribution is well proxied by t h e c hange in average 5 Let average consumption utility at the baseline level of UI be v n o t e t h a t t h i s d o e s n o t include search o r w ork disutility. Then the certainty equivalent e is the level of consumption satisfying (1= )(e + ) = v. Let c be baseline average consumption. Then e = 0 :9958 c, implying little scope for further improvements in utility from consumption smoothing. consumption, without considering its variability. The fact that the consumption innovation due to job loss eventually starts to rise as UI is raised also shows that UI is achieving little here in terms of consumption smoothing. Instead, the main gain in utility as UI is increased comes from decreases in work disutility. On the other hand, it is also reasonable to claim that this model overstates equilibrium consumption insurance relative to the US economy. Unemployment is higher than intended, re ecting relatively low search activity, even though hiring is higher than our target level of 1% of output. Also, the consumption innovation due to job loss is lower than the 7% loss documented by Gruber (1994) . Although asset holdings (not reported here) are similar to US levels, the fact that this model considers unemployment risk only, ignoring health risk and uncertainty about the length of life, may mean that asset holdings here represent more e ective insurance than pertains in reality. For these three reasons, our model may understate the consumption smoothing importance of UI.
4 Tax incidence and wage bargaining
The baseline model described in the previous section assumed that rms paid the taxes nancing UI and social security bene ts. Here, we will recalculate the model under the assumption that it is the workers, instead, who pay the taxes nancing bene ts. This is a natural issue to explore since social security taxes, for instance, are deducted directly from worker's paychecks in the U.S. However, it is far from obvious that this distinction should matter in standard competitive models, tax incidence has no real e ects. Shifting the tax burden from the rm to the worker in such a model typically raises the wage by the exact amount of the shifted tax. Neither the rm nor the worker has any change in disposable income and since both face exactly the same incentives as before, there is no e ect on equilibrium labor supply. If the level of tax were changed, the real costs of employment w ould change, a ecting the equilibrium quantity of labor employed but tax incidence itself has no impact.
We n o w show that, in a search model, tax incidence does have real e ects. In the previous section, since tax payments did not depend on whether or not work occurred, they did not enter into the expression for the instantaneous surplus associated with working relative to striking. Attributing share of the surplus to the worker yielded: 
Let us assume instead that the worker pays the taxes note that we must therefore distinguish in this section between the after-tax wage, which w e will write asŵ, and the before-tax wageŵ + . We continue to assume that taxes are due regardless of whether a strike occurs the worker's gains are thus 
the worker is lower by the amount , which means that the worker under this new speci cation is less willing to search for a job. Since must be fairly large to nance the level of social security in our baseline equilibrium, this alteration of the model is likely to have a big impact on the equilibrium.
We also see that, conditional on M U , , M P L , and labor's share of income, the parameterization of D W would behigher in this model than it was in our baseline. Labor's share should be equated to (ŵ+ )n=(An k 1;
;h) regardless of tax incidence, since the taxes are used to nance worker bene ts hence the inclusion of in equation (20) implies a higher D W . Computing an equilibrium based on this higher D W will also imply that workers are substantially less willing to search for work.
From the preceding discussion, it is probably clear already that not only tax incidence, but also the issue of whether tax must be paid when a strike occurs, is important f o r deriving our wage equation. Again, this question has no role in a competitive model strikes cannot have any e ect on a model in which, by de nition, workers can be costlessly replaced. The assumption that tax liabilities are waived in case of a strike is a reasonable one, clearly applicable to social security taxes, which are a part of the wage bill. Consider, then, the case in which taxes are paid by workers, but liability i s waived if a strike occurs. The worker's surplus from working is then the after-tax wagê w M U ; D W , for the worker owes nothing if she strikes, and earnsŵ net if she works. The rm's gain from work rather than strike is the marginal product of labor minus the before-tax wage it must pay to the worker, which is (M P L ; ( w + )) M Uin units of utility. Thus the wage equation is:
or equivalentlyŵ
with the following parameterization equation:
This same set of equations also applies for other tax incidence situations, as long as the tax is not due when strikes occur. That is, if the tax is paid by the rm, but is not due when there is a strike, then the worker's gain from work isŵ M U ;D W , and the rm's surplus is (M P L ;( w + ))M U , exactly the same expressions used to derive (21)-(23).
We see that this latest version of the wage equation has implications intermediate between the other two. This speci cation implies a lower after-tax wage than the baseline (16), though not as low as equation (19), and it implies a higher parameterization of D W than (17), though not as high as (20). This speci cation, in which taxes are not due if a strike occurs, is an appealing one for the U.S. economy. The fact that the model is then robust to tax incidence is also attractive. However, it was not chosen as the baseline version of the model for Costain (1997b) , because it was found to bedi cult to pick parameters that t this version of the model well. As pointed out above, this version implies a higher parameterization of D W , for otherwise it yields an equilibrium with lower labor share. But the high disutility of work D W leads to much lower search e ort, especially in the rst period after job loss, implying an equilibrium unemployment rate that is too high. Hence, for our baseline, we used instead the speci cation with taxes paid by rms and invariant t o strikes.
Results: variable tax case
In Tables 6 and 7 , we report the results of a calculation incorporating a wage based on the assumption that taxes vary with strikes. That is, the model is exactly that used in Section 3, except that the baseline wage equation (16) is replaced with (22). All parameters are the same as their original values reported in Table 3 , including the disutility o f w ork D W .
Note that the equilibrium after-tax wage in this version of the economy is down around 0.67, as opposed to 0.77 in our baseline model. As expected, hiring incentives are greatly altered by this shift in tax incidence and labor costs. We see in Table 7 that rms are hiring strenously recruitment costs are over 6% of value added, in response to the lower labor costs that rms face in this model. On the other hand, workers are not at all happy a b o u t w orking for these low w ages, so we see in the next table that a very large fraction of workers choose not to search at all in their rst period of unemployment, except at the lowest replacement ratios. In fact, at b U = 0 :33, almost all workers choose not to search during their rst period of unemployment, which guarantees that unemployment will be above 2 = 0 :08.
Like the level of unemployment, the rise in unemployment is considerably larger here than in the baseline model unemployment rises by a full three percent as the UI bene t is raised from 0.1 to 0.33, as opposed to a 1.7% rise in the baseline case. Since workers now share in tax incidence, unlike the baseline case, the rise in unemployment is caused more by decreased search activity (especially in the form of zero initial search) rather than decreased hiring. This rise in unemployment is accompanied by a large drop in the capital stock. Value added drops much more than in the baseline, both because of the larger drop in capital and there is little decrease in hiring expenditure to o set falling gross output. Recalling that t h e b e n e t o f r e d u c e d work roughly balanced the loss of consumption due to UI in our baseline, we see in this case that the large loss of consumption hurts workers much more. In fact, utility declines steeply with UI in this version of the model the certainty equivalent of the loss of consumption utility is roughly twice as large as the certainty equivalent of the decrease in work disutility. Thus, workers would give up 1.38% of consumption in order to decrease UI from 0.33 to 0.1.
Monopsonistic wage bargaining
In this section, we t a k e i n to account the fact that a rm's investment and hiring change the marginal product of labor at that rm, so that, under bilateral bargaining, the wage is changed. While this e ect should be recognized by the rm when it chooses investment and hiring, this has often been neglected. Most papers in the matching literature treat all hirings as bilateral events between a single worker and a single \vacancy", thus avoiding the possibility of interactions between the wage bargains of di erent workers moreover, the wage is typically taken as given in deriving the rst-order condition on investment. In such a model, Pissarides (1990,Ch.2) , shows the equivalence of the one-on-one matching framework with an economy allowing for larger rms. On the other hand, Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) argue that hiring additional workers should drive d o wn the wages of all workers at a rm, and they solve a complicated multi-agent bargaining problem which incorporates a monopsony feature of this sort. Bertola and Caballero (1994) also treat dynamic labor accumulation in an economy where the rm recognizes the e ects of investment and hiring on the wage of all its employees.
Without taking sides in this theoretical debate, we ask here whether it has quantitative importance by comparing the model from Section 3, which ignored interactions between wage bargains, with an alternative in which the rm anticipates wage changes when it alters hiring or investment. Again we must point out that this is an issue which does not arise in traditional competitive models. In a model where there are no search or matching costs, a rm would indeed recognize its power on wages if it were the only local purchaser of labor, or one of a few. However, with frictional labor markets, the size and capital intensity of the rm could a ect wages even with many rms in the market, for it is the ex-post bilateral surplus which causes the e ects considered here, not the actual number of rms in the market. Equivalently, as long as outside options do not bind, it is the marginal product of labor at a given rm that matters for wage formation, not the marginal product of labor in the economy as a whole.
The rm's rst-order conditions, in monopsonistic case, are: R ; exp(; ) = q A n t ;1 k t R ; exp(; k ) = A(1 ; )n t k t ; n t @w @k (n t k t ) (25) Making use of our baseline wage equation (14), the partial derivative terms in the rm's necessary conditions become n t @w @n (n t k t ) = A ( ; 1)n t ;1 k t 1; (26) n t @w @k (n t k t ) = A (1 ; )n t k t ; (27) Now both of the rst-order conditions imply a higher labor-to-capital ratio than the baseline model. The wage depends positively on the marginal product of labor at the rm, which declines as the rm hires more, or as it invests less hence there is greater hiring and/or decreased investment, as compared with the baseline model.
Results: monopsony case
A simulation allowing for these monopsony e ects is reported in Tables 8 and  9 . The model is exactly the same as that in Section 3, except for the rm's rst-order conditions, and the baseline parameters are used. This economy shares interesting similarities and di erences with the one from the previous section. Once again, it has low wages, lots of hiring, and many workers who prefer not to search at all as long as they are covered by UI. Hiring is almost 10% of value added when b U = 0:1, though it declines quickly as the UI bene tis increased. There is also an extremely low capital stock, only about 60% of the level observed in our other simulations. The resulting low w ages, and the ease of nding a job quickly, give w orkers a great incentive not to search in their rst period of UI eligibility hence again we have an unemployment rate slightly above 8%. Clearly, all these observations are compatible with the monopsonistic incentive we have beendiscussing.
Although this equilibrium appears somewhat similar to the variable-tax version analyzed in the last section, its response to UI could not bemore different. The tendency to overhire because of monopsony incentives amounts to a very powerful negative externality among rms. As UI is increased, hiring expenditure falls substantially, but this is bene cial since there was too much hiring to start with. In fact, we observe a large increase in the capitallabor ratio as the UI bene t is increased, actually leading to a rise in output. Unsurprisingly, t h i s h a s an extremely positive w elfare impact the optimal replacement ratio appears from our calculations to be well over 100%.
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In going 7 Obviously, though, we should not assume that our model is well-suited to studying an economy with a replacement ratio over 100%. from b = 0 :33 to b = 0 :7, the capital stock rises slightly, from 4.26 to 4.37, and value added rises even more than recruitment costs fall. Meanwhile, the worker gains consumption utility w orth almost 3% of value added, and decreases work disutility by 0.2% she su ers only from increased search e ort due to higher unemployment.
It is also interesting to note that the change in consumption from increased UI is initially negative, for a rise in UI produces a much larger increase in unemployment when b U is low than when it is high. We see from Table 9 that the reason for the initial sharp rise in unemployment i s t h a t m a n y w orkers choose not to search in their rst period of unemployment, once the UI bene trises above approximately 0.3. After this initial adjustment, most workers appear to leave their search behavior mostly unchanged, for the fraction not searching and the probability of job nding when unemployed remain approximately the same above b U = 0 :4.
6 The threat point: strike versus separation 6.1 The outside option principle in a matching model Up to this point, we h a ve employed a Nash bargaining solution, assuming that the worker and the rm each receive xed shares of match surplus, de ned relative to the threat point of a strike. However, the relevant t h r e a t p o i n ts are a matter of debate in the literature. To help explain the alternatives under debate, we will make reference to the Rubinstein alternating o ers formulation of the bargaining game, since it is this game that is usually seen as providing the strategic underpinnings of the Nash split and of the appropriate threat points.
The baseline speci cation used in this paper and in Costain (1997b) is what we have called the \strike threat" wage.
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It is most easily explained by considering a period-by-period formulation, in which each period'swage is determined by playing an alternating o ers bargaining game at the start of the period. If a wage is agreed upon during the bargaining game, then work occurs, so the payo which accrues to the worker and the rm during the period is M P L M U ;D W .
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If no wage is agreed upon, there is nonetheless no credible reason for either party to leave the match: each player would decrease her expected future utility by separating. No output would beproduced, and no disutility incurred, since the worker is not willing to work except in exchange for a wage payment, so that period's payo is zero. 10 Attributing share of that period's surplus to the worker yields the strike threat wage equation:
The alternative \quit threat" wage which is more common in the general equilibrium matching literature is more easily described in intertemporal terms.
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Let V W and V F be the equilibrium present discounted utilities of a worker and a rm when they are currently matched let U W and U F be their present discounted utilities when unmatched. The quit threat bargaining equation then simply states that the worker's increment in intertemporal welfare upon matching is fraction of the total increment in intertemporal welfare:
By writing the present discounted utilities of the agents in terms of the wage, it will be possible to derive an expression for the wage from (29).
9 Lifetime utility, of course, also includes a continuation payo for future periods, but we need not take i t i n to account in the argument w h i c h f o l l o ws. 10 The subtle point which is being glossed over in this description of the game is that we are assuming probability zero of arrival of an alternative m a t c h opportunity during the strike. However, this is in fact reasonable in an endogenous search equilibrium.
11 Although we state the strike threat derivation in terms of a bargaining game over one period's wage, and the quit threat derivation in terms of a bargaining game over a wage for the whole lifetime of the match, Costain (1996) demonstrates that the chosen timing has no impact on the distinction between the two bargaining solutions. Each solution can be derived under either time framework, but the quit threat wage arises as a subgame perfect equilibrium only if search i n tensity is exogenous and is equally e ective for unemployed and matched individuals.
One might assume that the Nash split stated in (29) could be derived from an alternating o ers game played at the initial moment of matching. The subtle point w h i c h complicates this conjecture, however, is the fact that at no point in the bargaining process is it a credible threat to separate, or even to expend disutility searching for an outside o er: hence it is hard to see how U W and U F could possibly enter into the equation as threat points. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) show that the quit threat wage equation can be derived as the subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternative o ers game, but only under a very restrictive assumption: the rate of arrival of new match partners is exogenously xed, and is the same for the unemployed and for those who are already matched. Wolinsky (1987) examines the case of endogenous search i n tensity and nds a subgame perfect equilibrium which, in the context of this paper, where all matches are identical, leads to the solution (28) which we have called the strike threat wage.
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The intuition behindthe fact that the strike threat wage is unrelated to the value of separation in an endogenous search model is very simple: at all times during the bargaining process, workers and rms expect immediate acceptance of the equilibrium (strike threat) wage hence, since all matches are identical, there is never any incentive for agents to expend disutility on search e ort once they have found one potential partner hence outside o ers which could motivate separation never arrive. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Wolinsky (1987) are both applications of the \outside option principle" derived in Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) , which a l l o ws us to restate the distinction between the two results somewhat more formally. Let us ignore the exogenous separation rate of our model and instead assume that matches, once formed, last until at least one party chooses to separate, for plays no role in our argument. Let E W and E F be the equilibrium payo s arising from the bargaining game for the worker and the rm since we are assuming no exogenous separation, these payo s are simply Costain (1996) independently but belatedly rederives a version of Wolinsky's result. if the discount rate is r. Let 
Deriving the quit threat wage
To compute the quit threat version of the model, we still need to derive an explicit wage equation from (29). We will again simplify our derivation by assuming a constant level of marginal utility, rather than allowing match surplus to vary with asset holdings. In order to solve for the wage, we need to distinguish between the value of employment and the va l u e s o f u n e m p l o yment in the rst, second, and later periods of an unemployment spell, since these In order to derive these functions without mention of asset holdings, we m ust not only ignore variation in marginal utility across individuals, but also ignore variation in search intensity across individuals in the same period of an unemployment spell. Hence we base our calculations on s 1 and s 2 , t h e a verage levels of search, in equilibrium, in the rst and later periods of unemployment, respectively. + (R + ( 1 ; e ; )(1 + C 0 )) 14 Hence under reasonable parameters we conclude that the quit threat wage will be somewhat higher than the strike threat wage, for given M P L and D W =M U .
Results: quit threat case
As expected, the wage has risen in this equilibrium relative to our baseline model. The wage rise is not as dramatic as the wage decreases in our previous two w age speci cation experiments, but it nonetheless has a substantial impact on the equilibrium. With the higher wage, we observe few unemployed workers choosing not to search only 1.3% set search e ort equal to zero, even at b U = 0:5. Firms, on the other hand, cut back drastically on hiring, relative to the baseline model recruitment costs are well under 1% of value added, except at the lowest level of UI. This leads to a high level of equilibrium unemployment, 9.696% at b U = 0 :33.
14 Note, very roughly, that b U , while B 4 B 3 .
Other aspects of this model, such as its interest rate and capital stock, behave quite similarly to the baseline. The strikingly large e ect of the wage decrease thus suggests a closer look at the external e ects linking the search and hiring choices of rms and workers. Note that in general, the e ects of on search and of q on hiring are ambiguous, as they imply welfare and substitution e ects which w ork in opposite directions. However, it is possible to show n umerically for the baseline version of the model that partial equilibrium increases in and q lead to declines in search and hiring (when we hold xed investment), respectively.
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Together, these facts imply strong e ects from a fall in w: this raises hiring and lowers search, causing q to fall and to rise, which then implies a further increase in hiring and a further decrease in search.
Again, we nd a sharp contrast in the e ects of UI, relative to our other models. Since unemployment is high, an increase in UI requires a large rise in taxes, which causes large changes in unemployment and in average consumption. Raising UI from 0.1 to 0.5 leads to a 4.210% rise in unemployment, as opposed to a 3.509% rise in the baseline case, and average consumption drops by 0:7727 ; 0:7465 = 0:0262 units, almost twice the change observed in the baseline model. With lower hiring here than in the baseline, the rise in unemployment is concentrated in decreased search, rather than decreased hiring. Thus decreased hiring yields little o setting e ect on the fall in gross output, explaining why the falls in value added and in consumption are so much larger than in the baseline. Also, at the high level of unemployment observed here, the rise in UI and unemployment leads to a much larger cost in terms of increased search disutility than in the baseline case. Overall, then, the utility impact of UI is very negative. Raising UI from 0.1 to 0.33 has a total utility impact equivalent t o a l o s s o f a l m o s t 1 % o f b a s e l i n e a verage consumption, while raising it from 0.33 to 0.5 amounts to another loss of over 1% of baseline average consumption. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have simulated four general equilibrium matching models. All the models are based on the same parameterization, in a nested framework which i s i n tended to provide a quantitative analysis of the e ects of unemployment insurance for the US economy. The models di er only in terms of rather subtle changes in the wage equation, drawn from theoretical debates regarding the appropriate speci cation of wage bargaining. These changes in the wage equation are shown to have large e ects on unemployment and on other aspects of the equilibrium. Since the welfare analysis of UI depends on the net impact of several o setting e ects, the optimal replacement ratio changes radically as the wage equation is changed. The importance of the wage equation appears especially large when compared to the consumption smoothing bene ts of UI, which are negligible in this log utility model, though they become somewhat larger in more risk averse simulations reported in Costain (1997b) . Imposing more realistic tax incidence on the model, namely a tax which is waived if a strike occurs, or a tax which is partly incident on the worker, leads to a higher parameterization of the disutility of work, and/or a lower equilibrium wage. Both these e ects greatly discourage job search, and lead to an equilibrium with high unemployment in which UI is very harmful.
Allowing for monopsony p o wer on the part of rms, so that hiring additional workers is anticipated to drive down the wage bargaining outcome with other workers, leads to a substantial incentive for over-hiring. Like the previous experiment, this implies an equilibrium in which hiring is relatively high, and search relatively low. However, in this case the elevated level of hiring is so ine cient that lowering it by raising UI has a v ery positive w elfare impact.
Finally, the quit threat wage is somewhat higher than the strike threat wage, and thus has less of a tendency to promote overhiring. With the quit threat wage, equilibrium search e ort is high, while hiring expenditure is low, and raising UI has very negative implications for welfare.
Several further generalizations can be made about our results. First, as discussed in Section 6.3, our model shows considerable sensitivity t o t h e w age, based on the externalities which result from the negative e ects of on search e ort and of q on hiring expenditure. Second, our welfare analyses appear to depend strongly on the relative quantities of hiring and search e ort that go into match formation. UI is most bene cial where it leads to relatively large decreases in hiring, rather than in search activity| namely, the baseline and monopsony cases. Though we h a ve not attempted to derive an e ciency criterion along the lines of Hosios (1990) for this complicated model, the contrasting welfare analyses suggest that our baseline equilibrium features somwhat too much hiring and not enough search. The e ects of tax incidence also feed through this mechanism, because the two versions which place part of tax incidence on the workers| the variable tax case and the quit threat case| have larger declines in search activity rather than in hiring as UI is raised.
Taken together, these calculations provide an important reminder of the fragility o f policy analysis models. They also remind us that non-competitive economies incorporate many profound externalities. They invite empirical work on wage setting, though the subtle wage interactions analyzed here do not promise easy empirical analysis.
